Yes, in a landmark antitrust settlement, the UFC agreed to pay $375 million to compensate fighters for illegally suppressed wages over a seven-year period. On February 6, 2025, U.S. District Judge Richard Boulware granted final approval to the settlement in the case *Le v. Zuffa*, concluding a decade-long legal battle over the company’s monopolistic control of mixed martial arts.
The settlement covers 1,088 fighters who competed between 2010 and 2017, with an average payout of approximately $250,000 per fighter—a rare instance of a labor antitrust claim succeeding at this scale. This article explains what the antitrust violations were, how the settlement amount was determined, who qualifies to claim, and what remains unresolved for fighters who competed after 2017. The settlement represents a historic victory for MMA athletes who argued they had no choice but to accept the UFC’s fighter pay because the promotion controlled the market almost entirely. Fighters alleged that the UFC eliminated or blocked competing promotions, leaving athletes with one option: sign with the UFC or find another sport. This monopsony—a market with a single buyer of labor—gave the UFC power to pay fighters significantly less than they would earn if the market were competitive.
Table of Contents
- What Were the UFC’s Antitrust Violations?
- How Did the Settlement Amount Get to $375 Million?
- Who Is Eligible and How Many Fighters Participated?
- How Do Fighters Claim Their Settlement Money?
- What About Fighters Who Competed After 2017?
- The Role of the Judge’s Rejection and Renegotiation
- What This Settlement Means for the Future of MMA
What Were the UFC’s Antitrust Violations?
The core allegation was that the UFC violated federal antitrust law by using anti-competitive tactics to suppress fighter compensation. According to court filings and settlement documents, the UFC controlled more than 80% of all MMA revenue in the United States. Rather than allowing other promotions to compete for fighter talent, the UFC allegedly acquired competing promotions, prevented fighters from working for rivals, and eliminated opportunities for fighters to earn elsewhere. This created what lawyers call a “monopsony”—the opposite of a monopoly.
Where a monopoly means one seller controlling supply, a monopsony means one buyer controlling demand. For fighters during the 2010–2017 period, this meant the UFC was often the only viable employer offering MMA competition at a professional level. Fighters who wanted to earn a living in mixed martial arts had little choice: accept whatever the UFC offered in purses and sponsorships, or leave the sport. The lawsuit claimed that in a competitive marketplace with multiple promotions bidding for fighter talent, purses would be significantly higher. A fighter earning $50,000 per fight under UFC monopoly conditions might command $150,000 or more if several promotions competed for their services—similar to how multiple teams bidding for an athlete in traditional sports drives salaries higher.
How Did the Settlement Amount Get to $375 Million?
The settlement process itself illustrates how judges scrutinize large class action deals. The UFC initially proposed a $335 million settlement in mid-2024, which Judge Richard Boulware rejected as insufficient in July 2024. The judge found the amount failed to adequately compensate fighters for the harm caused by suppressed wages over seven years. In response, the UFC and fighters’ attorneys negotiated an increased settlement of $375 million, which the judge approved in February 2025.
The final figure of $375 million translates to an average of approximately $250,000 per fighter across the 1,088 eligible class members. However, not all fighters receive the same amount. Claims are calculated based on individual fighting records and earnings during the relevant period (2010–2017), meaning fighters who competed more frequently or earned higher purses during this time receive larger payouts. The settlement is structured to cover an estimated 99% of the total compensation earned by class members during the lawsuit period, reflecting a comprehensive effort to make fighters whole for the harm caused by wage suppression.
Who Is Eligible and How Many Fighters Participated?
Eligibility for the settlement is limited to fighters who competed in the UFC between January 1, 2010, and November 15, 2017. The settlement class includes 1,121 fighters total, and an unprecedented 1,088 of them—97%—have filed claims seeking compensation. This extraordinarily high participation rate stands in stark contrast to typical class action settlements, where many class members never submit claims and leave money unclaimed.
In the UFC settlement, nearly every eligible fighter went through the claims process, suggesting they viewed the compensation as meaningful and the process as legitimate. The high participation rate serves as a practical advantage for individual fighters: since so many eligible fighters are claiming funds, the total pool of $375 million is split among a large group, which prevents the per-fighter average from being diluted by unclaimed shares. In some class action settlements, if few people claim, the remaining class members who do claim receive larger shares; in this settlement, the opposite dynamic applies, and broad participation ensures an equitable distribution. Fighters who were major stars (like those who fought for titles) likely earned higher purses and will receive higher settlement payouts, while up-and-coming fighters or those with fewer bouts will receive lower amounts, all calculated proportionally to individual earnings.
How Do Fighters Claim Their Settlement Money?
The claims process for the UFC antitrust settlement is administered by a neutral claims administrator, separate from both the UFC and the fighters’ legal team. Eligible fighters must submit a claim form that includes documentation of their UFC fights during the 2010–2017 period—a relatively straightforward process since the UFC maintains comprehensive records of all fights, fighters, and purses from that era. The UFC’s internal records serve as the primary evidence, so fighters generally don’t need to produce pay stubs or contracts to prove they fought for the company.
Claims are calculated using a formula based on two main factors: the number of fights a fighter competed in during the settlement period and the purses they earned for those fights. A fighter who competed in 20 UFC bouts and earned a total of $500,000 during the 2010–2017 window will receive a larger settlement check than a fighter with 5 bouts and $80,000 in earnings, because the harm from wage suppression scales with the fighter’s market exposure. However, one important limitation: fighters who signed releases or settlement agreements with the UFC before this class action was filed may be ineligible, as they already resolved similar claims individually. Additionally, fighters who moved on to other MMA promotions after the 2017 cutoff and earned significantly more do not receive additional compensation for suppression in those later roles—the settlement only covers the 2010–2017 period.
What About Fighters Who Competed After 2017?
Notably, the UFC antitrust battle is not fully resolved. A separate lawsuit, *Johnson v. Zuffa*, covers fighters who competed from 2017 onward and remains active in federal court. That case is currently in the discovery phase, meaning attorneys are gathering documents and depositions to build the case. However, *Johnson v. Zuffa* has a different objective than *Le v.
Zuffa*: rather than seeking back pay for wage suppression, it aims to force the UFC to change its future business practices—such as allowing fighters to compete for other promotions or negotiate more freely—going forward. One warning for fighters competing after 2017: while that class action proceeds, no settlement has been reached, and no compensation has been approved. Fighters in that class should not expect payments anytime soon, as discovery can take years and a trial is possible if settlement negotiations fail. Additionally, the fighter who led *Johnson v. Zuffa* and other class representatives have pursued structural remedies (rule changes) rather than monetary payouts, though the case could still result in both. For fighters who competed in both the 2010–2017 and 2017-onward periods, the *Le v. Zuffa* settlement covers only the earlier period.
The Role of the Judge’s Rejection and Renegotiation
Judge Richard Boulware’s initial rejection of the $335 million settlement in July 2024 played a crucial role in the settlement’s final structure. When a judge finds a proposed class action settlement “inadequate” under federal law, they must reject it and typically give the parties an opportunity to renegotiate. This is one of the few protections a judge has to prevent “sweetheart deals” where plaintiff attorneys and defendants settle for less than a fair value while the actual class members suffer.
In this case, Judge Boulware determined that $335 million did not adequately reflect the harm caused by the UFC’s monopoly control and wage suppression across thousands of fighters over seven years. The UFC’s willingness to increase the settlement from $335 million to $375 million—a 12% increase—suggests the company recognized the judge’s message and preferred to settle rather than face continued litigation risk. From the fighters’ perspective, Judge Boulware’s scrutiny was instrumental in securing an additional $40 million in compensation. This is an example of judicial review protecting class members from selling their claims too cheaply.
What This Settlement Means for the Future of MMA
The UFC antitrust settlement establishes important legal precedent for labor markets and monopsony power. Historically, antitrust law focused on “monopoly” problems (one seller, many buyers), but this case illustrated how “monopsony” problems (one buyer, many sellers of labor) are equally harmful. The UFC’s control of the MMA market gave it the power to pay fighters below-competitive wages, much like how a single large employer in a small town can suppress local wages. This settlement signals that courts will take such claims seriously and can award substantial damages to workers harmed by such market concentration. However, the settlement also leaves questions open.
The UFC remains the dominant MMA promotion with 80%+ market share, and the *Johnson v. Zuffa* case is still pursuing structural changes to prevent future wage suppression. Whether the UFC will be forced to truly open up competition or simply pay higher purses while maintaining dominance remains to be seen. For now, fighters competing after 2017 await the outcome of *Johnson v. Zuffa*, while those in the 2010–2017 class can proceed with filing claims for their $375 million settlement.