The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has dealt a significant blow to consumers seeking to sue under federal do-not-call protections, ruling that text messages do not qualify as “telephone calls” under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). In Steidinger v. Blackstone Medical Services, decided July 14, 2026, the court held that Section 227(c) of the TCPA does not provide a private right of action for unwanted marketing text messages.
This means that if you received an unwanted text from a company trying to sell you something—say, a debt settlement service or medical device offer—you cannot sue in Illinois, Indiana, or Wisconsin based on that text message alone, even though the TCPA’s do-not-call registry explicitly applies to text communication. This is the first federal appellate court to squarely address whether text messages constitute “telephone calls” under the TCPA’s text-messaging provision, making it a watershed moment in consumer litigation. The decision was unanimous and decisive, with Judge Thomas Kirsch writing that the ordinary meaning of “telephone call” in 1991—when the TCPA was enacted—required the reproduction of sound, something text messages fundamentally cannot do. The ruling immediately affects millions of residents in three states while leaving open critical questions about what happens in other federal circuits.
Table of Contents
- What Does the 7th Circuit Ruling Actually Prohibit?
- The Court’s Legal Reasoning and Interpretive Method
- Geographic Limitations and the Seventh Circuit Boundary
- How This Ruling Differs from Other TCPA Text Message Protections
- What Consumer Protections Still Exist After Steidinger
- Implications for Large-Scale Litigation and Class Actions
- The Unresolved Questions Remaining for Future Courts
What Does the 7th Circuit Ruling Actually Prohibit?
The Seventh Circuit’s holding is narrowly focused on one specific subsection of the TCPA: Section 227(c)(5), which covers do-not-call protections related to traditional telephones. The court concluded that this particular provision cannot be enforced through private lawsuits against companies that send unsolicited text messages. However, this does not mean text messages are unregulated under the TCPA or that you have no recourse whatsoever. Other sections of the TCPA—particularly Section 227(b), which covers cellular telephones and SMS messages specifically—may still allow private actions in some cases, though this too remains contested in other jurisdictions.
The practical impact is significant for the three states in the Seventh Circuit’s jurisdiction. A consumer who receives 50 unwanted text messages from a payday lender offering quick cash cannot bring a lawsuit based on Section 227(c) violations in federal court. By contrast, the same consumer in neighboring Missouri or Minnesota might have a stronger legal claim under how those circuits interpret the statute, depending on whether their appellate courts have addressed the question differently. This geographic patchwork creates incentives for companies to operate differently across state lines, though most large businesses operate nationally and must comply with the stricter interpretation of whichever circuit they face litigation in.
The Court’s Legal Reasoning and Interpretive Method
Judge Kirsch’s opinion applied the Supreme Court’s interpretive framework from Bostock v. Clayton County, which requires courts to apply the ordinary public meaning of statutory language as understood when the law was enacted. For the TCPA, that meant consulting 1991 dictionaries to understand what “telephone call” meant to Congress at the time. Those dictionaries defined “telephone” as an instrument for reproducing sounds at a distance, and “call” as communication by telephone.
Since text messages do not reproduce sound and cannot be “calls” in the ordinary sense, the Seventh Circuit concluded they fall outside Section 227(c)(5)’s scope. This textual approach matters because it creates a high bar for any plaintiff arguing that Congress implicitly intended text messages to be covered. The court noted that Congress knew how to amend the TCPA to explicitly include new communication methods—it had done so in other subsections to specifically add text messages as prohibited under different provisions. The fact that Congress expressly added text message coverage elsewhere but notably did not amend Section 227(c)(5) to include text messages suggested intentional exclusion rather than accidental omission. This reasoning directly contradicts arguments from consumer advocates who contend that Congress intended broad protection regardless of the technological form communication takes.
Geographic Limitations and the Seventh Circuit Boundary
The Steidinger ruling applies only to cases arising within the Seventh Circuit’s jurisdiction: Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin. Companies operating exclusively in these three states cannot be sued in federal court for text message violations under Section 227(c)(5). However, any large company operating nationally faces a patchwork of legal standards. The Sixth Circuit (covering Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee) has not yet ruled on this question. The Second Circuit (New York, Connecticut, Vermont) has not yet ruled.
The Ninth Circuit (covering the West Coast) has not yet ruled. This means a company operating in all 50 states cannot adopt a uniform text-messaging policy; instead, it must assume the strictest interpretation applies wherever it operates. This geographic uncertainty will likely persist for years. Consumers in other circuits may still pursue private lawsuits arguing that text messages fall under Section 227(c), and plaintiffs’ lawyers will likely forum-shop, filing cases in circuits where no appellate decision yet exists or where district courts have ruled differently. The Supreme Court could ultimately resolve this nationwide, but the Court has shown little appetite for TCPA cases in recent years, preferring to let circuit-level disagreement develop. For now, Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin residents have demonstrably fewer rights under the TCPA than residents of most other states—a limitation with no counterpart in other consumer protection statutes.
How This Ruling Differs from Other TCPA Text Message Protections
A critical misunderstanding surrounds what the Seventh Circuit actually prohibited. The TCPA’s do-not-call registry itself applies to text messages—the Federal Trade Commission and FCC maintain lists of consumers who do not want to receive marketing texts. Marketing companies are legally prohibited from texting numbers on these registries. What the Seventh Circuit ruling eliminated is the private right of action to sue over violations; enforcement now falls to government agencies, not individual consumers filing class actions. This creates a practical gap.
If you are on the national do-not-call registry and receive 100 unwanted marketing texts, you cannot sue in the Seventh Circuit. You must report the violations to the FTC or FCC, both of which are understaffed and prioritize egregious violations affecting large populations. Small businesses, scammers, and fly-by-night operations may never face enforcement. Meanwhile, if you receive unwanted robocalls to your phone—which may now be conducted via text but could also use VoIP or SMS gateways—other TCPA provisions may still provide private rights of action in the Seventh Circuit. The difference turns on fine technical distinctions about which subsection applies, which creates a litigation minefield even for informed consumers.
What Consumer Protections Still Exist After Steidinger
Despite the Seventh Circuit’s narrow holding, several layers of consumer protection remain intact. Section 227(b) of the TCPA, which specifically addresses cellular telephones and covers autodialed or prerecorded calls to cell phones, may still provide a private right of action for text messages in some contexts. However, the Seventh Circuit has not ruled on Section 227(b), and other circuits have disagreed about whether it applies to SMS. Additionally, state laws offer alternative causes of action.
Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin all have their own statutes addressing unsolicited telemarketing and text communications, some with their own private rights of action or allowing consumers to seek damages through state consumer protection acts. The warning here is that relying on these alternative protections is riskier and often requires more expensive litigation. State law claims may not allow for class actions in the same way TCPA did, reducing the incentive for plaintiff attorneys to take smaller cases. State statutory damages may be lower than TCPA damages (the TCPA allows $500-$1,500 per call or message, among the highest in consumer law). A consumer in Wisconsin injured by unwanted marketing texts must now navigate a more fragmented legal landscape where the easiest federal tool has been removed.
Implications for Large-Scale Litigation and Class Actions
The Steidinger ruling immediately impacts pending lawsuits. Any existing class action alleging only Section 227(c) violations in the Seventh Circuit will likely be dismissed. Plaintiffs’ attorneys will face difficult strategic choices: appeal to the Supreme Court (unlikely to grant review), add alternative state-law claims (requiring different proof and potentially different damages frameworks), or refocus on Section 227(b) claims (which courts have historically interpreted more narrowly than plaintiffs hoped). For consumers already part of a class action against a company for unwanted texts, the ruling may mean losing the federal lawsuit but discovering new opportunities under state law—a complicated trade-off with no clear winner.
Class action practice will shift toward companies headquartered in or primarily operating outside the Seventh Circuit. A company receiving notice of a class action in California, Florida, or New York will face different legal exposure than an identical company in Chicago or Indianapolis. This incentivizes future corporate formation and operations decisions, though large institutions will continue operating nationwide and accepting the aggregate legal risk. For individual consumers, the practical effect is that if you live in the Seventh Circuit, your text message claims have become materially weaker unless you can prove additional violations under other TCPA provisions or state law.
The Unresolved Questions Remaining for Future Courts
The Steidinger decision leaves several critical questions unanswered that future litigation will address. Can Section 227(b), which specifically addresses cellular telephones and does not mention “calls” in the same way, provide a private right of action for text messages? Courts disagree, and the Seventh Circuit has not weighed in. Does Congress’s express amendment of certain TCPA subsections to include text messages imply that unmodified subsections do not apply to texts, or does it merely constitute belt-and-suspenders redundancy? Different judges will answer differently.
Finally, if one federal circuit holds that text messages are not “calls” under TCPA Section 227(c), what happens to the FTC and FCC’s own interpretation that the do-not-call registry applies to text messages? That regulatory interpretation now floats in uncertain legal territory. The Steidinger ruling represents a decisive win for companies operating in the Seventh Circuit and a clear loss for consumers seeking federal remedies. However, it also crystallizes an important dividing line: other federal circuits have not adopted this reasoning, and the Supreme Court has not spoken. Consumers and attorneys in Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin now operate under a different legal regime than those in neighboring states, a fragmentation that may eventually force appellate or Supreme Court intervention.